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Introduction  
 
In the public discourse, the so-called Islamic State (a.k.a. Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham 
[ISIS]) has cultivated the reputation for a sophisticated and out of this world ability to 
hypnotize bored youth over social media (for nuanced reading see, Gilsinan 2015, Byman 
2017, Amarasingam and Berger 2017). One would expect that scholarly work would not act 
as an exaggeration machine for such an ill-conceived notion. Employing 12 confusing tweets 
(contents posted on twitter, the micro-blogging social media platform) of a single user, a 
                                                 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Asaad Almohammad, Ph.D., Email: asaadh84@gmail.com, Twitter: 
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Abstract 
This article aims to clarify the role of the so-called Islamic State’s (a.k.a. ISIS) 
online activities on radicalization. To that effect, all empirical endeavors on the 
underpinning phenomenon in Vox-Pol’s library were systematically reviewed and 
assessed. This exhaustive review suggests that Radicalization Leading to Violence 
(RLV) offers a nuanced conceptualization of the complex, emergent, and non-
linear and dynamic phenomenon. Findings of the included studies were recorded, 
visualized, and clustered, allowing the discussion of possible scenarios, and thus, 
the inference of a utilitarian model of RLV dynamics based on the conceptual map 
of the literature. On the basis of connectivity and affordance opportunities (online 
and offline [beyond the digital realm]), Total Islam (i.e., a totalizing identity 
marker rather than an indicator of religiosity) is posited to be a critical element of 
the inferred model. ISIS is argued to use both affordance opportunities in a way 
that capitalizes on the manifestations of Total Islam to mobilize those embracing 
this form identity across different RLV trajectories. To that end, the paper is 
concluded by discussing its implications, limitations, and recommendations for 
future research. 
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study went on to claim, “extremism Islamic propaganda can radicalize… the target young 
Islamic males by strengthening the in-group identification … and hatred against other groups, 
and by magnifying the external threats from other groups” (Chatfield, Reddick, & 
Brajawidagda, 2015, P. 245). Commentators (Brooking & Singer, 2016; WIRED, 2016; 
Warrick, 2017), academics (Farwell, 2014; Fernandez, 2015; Berger, 2015; Ali, 2015), and 
governmental agencies (Comey, 2015; The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2016; 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 2016) noted the ISIS’ adaptive use 
of the internet, including: 
 
I. Social media platforms, especially twitter (Vidino & Hughes, 2015). 
II. Encrypted messaging applications including, Telegram (Bloom, Tiflati, & Horgan, 
2017), Wickr (Homeland Security Committee Homeland Security Committee, 2016), 
and WhatsApp (Shane & Hubbard, 2014).  
III. The dark web (Weimann, 2016). 
 
The cited resources outlined experts’, politicians’, and journalists’ arguments that ISIS’ 
online activities (operations over the internet) and its ability to disseminate propaganda allow 
the organization to incite violence, radicalize, and recruit individuals to serve its causes. For 
instance, on May 26, 2017, the G7 asserted that “we will combat the misuse of the Internet by 
terrorists. While being one of the most important technological achievements in the last 
decades, the Internet has also proven to be a powerful tool for terrorist purposes” (Medium, 
2017). In the aftermath of June 3, 2017 terrorist attack in London, Theresa May, Prime 
Minister of the UK, declared “enough is enough,” and that the government would increase its 
counterterrorism measures to deny terrorists “the safe spaces it needs to breed,” both online 
and offline (Erlanger, 2017). 
Much has been written on ISIS’ online operations and the mobilization of individuals 
down their violent radicalization paths (e.g., Berger & Morgan, 2015; Alexander, 2016; 
Hughes & Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2017; Gill, et al., 2017; Berger, 2016; Smith, et al., 2015; 
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Huey & Witmer, 2016; Vidino & Hughes, 2015; Ducol, et al., 2016; Reynolds, 2016; Conseil 
du statut de la femme & Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, 
2016). Yet elements and processes governing the dynamics of such mobilization remain 
ambiguous in both the online (over the Internet) and offline (beyond the digital realm) 
milieus. Cases of ISIS recruitment in the west offer little support to overwhelming 
mobilization trajectories that take place exclusively online (e.g., Alexander, 2016; Hughes & 
Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2017; Gill, et al., 2017; Smith, et al., 2015; Vidino & Hughes, 2015). To 
that end, research on this phenomenon faces numerous challenges, including but not limited to 
sensitivity and complexity of radicalization and little publicly available primary and 
secondary data. 
However, notwithstanding such obstacles, scholars compiled data on individuals in the 
legal system through government records and press material (e.g., Alexander, 2016; Hughes 
& Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2017; Gill, et al., 2017; Smith, et al., 2015; Vidino & Hughes, 2015; 
Reynolds, 2016). Moreover, researchers are also using interviews with returnees and/or 
defectors and big data to assess violent extremism related factors (e.g., Berger & Morgan, 
2015; Berger, 2016; Conseil du statut de la femme & Centre for the Prevention of 
Radicalization Leading to Violence, 2016; Gómez, et al., 2017). Answers to questions about 
mobilization dynamics and the role of online activities in violent radicalization trajectories 
remain unclear and demand still more research. Therefore, the current effort systematically 
reviews and probes available findings and observations to infer a model of such dynamics, 
based on the findings of the meta-analysis and the examined conceptual map of the literature. 
 
Method 
 
Giving Vox-Pol’s2 (Virtual Centre of Excellence for Research in Violent Online Political 
Extremism) focus on online violent extremism and its effort to compile various materials on 
                                                 
2 Vox-Pol is the academic network of the European Union Framework Program that focuses 
on researching violent online extremism and measures to counter it. 
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the phenomenon (e.g., videos, government reports, academic research, etc.), its library was 
selected to obtain studies focusing on: ISIS, radicalization, online activities, and mobilization 
trajectories. Vox-Pol is “€5+ million project that integrates the world’s leading researchers 
and research groups in Violent Online Political Extremism (VOPE), to include those 
researching the intersection of terrorism and the Internet (incl. violent jihadists, violent 
separatists, etc.), the online activities of the extreme Right, the potential for violent online 
radicalisation, etc.” (European Commission 2014).  
To avoid search bias, all studies on ISIS with the term Radicalization were obtained 
and assessed. To that effect, material published between 2014 (the year ISIS declared its 
caliphate) and 12 May, 2017 (the date of search). 103 out of the 514 library entries were 
published during this period. The current study aims to include all empirical work on 
radicalization and the role online activities (e.g., propaganda, recruitment, etc.) on the 
mobilization trajectories of ISIS recruits, supporters, and/or sympathizers. In an effort to 
minimize inclusion bias, all empirical efforts, regardless of the methods and number of cases, 
were assessed. After reading the abstracts/executive summaries and introductions of the 103 
reports/papers, only 21 efforts were found to meet the inclusion criteria. That is to say, 
empirical and included at least one case of an ISIS’ recruit, supporter, and/or sympathizer. 
The dearth of empirical endeavors on the phenomenon is hardly surprising and corresponds to 
earlier reports (von Behr, Reding, Edwards, & Gribbon, 2013). It is noteworthy that the 
Rand’s report included studies on various forms of radicalization (i.e., jihadist-based and 
right-wing extremists). The 21 studies were examined further to determine whether they 
presented any empirical evidence. After reading the 21 articles and reports, only 19 withstood 
this scrutiny. Studies that survived the reduction were thoroughly reviewed. Then, a data file 
of the 19 studies was created using Microsoft Word (47 pages: 10 points, single space). The 
studies were presented in a table demonstrating: the study’s number, citation, main field(s), 
method, number of subjects/cases, variables/themes, and thorough review of the study. The 
data file was submitted to this journal to allow the reviewers and editor to assess the steps 
taken to carry out later analyses.  
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Furthermore, on the basis of methodological rigor, the included studies were 
systematically assessed. A number of the included studies resorted to computational science, 
solely, to detect radicalization-associated factors (Ghajar-Khosravi, Kwantes, Derbentseva, & 
Huey, 2016; Saif, Fernandez, Rowe, & Alani, 2016; Ferrara, 2017; Awan, 2017; Berger, 
2016; Berger & Morgan, 2015). In line with an earlier report (von Behr, Reding, Edwards, & 
Gribbon, 2013), this category of research was found to suffer theoretical and empirical 
challenges hindering its contribution to the fields of violent extremism or counterterrorism. 
However, among the studies using computational science and satisfying the inclusion criteria, 
two reports emerged as methodologically rigorous endeavors (Berger & Morgan, 2015; 
Berger, 2016). Both studies disclosed and detailed the methods and associated caveats and 
thus, were retained and utilized in further analyses. That said, the phenomenon was not 
always investigated by focusing only on social media or the online milieu. Empirical studies 
indicate interactions between the two milieus rather than exclusively online radicalization 
dynamics (Alexander, 2016; Hughes & Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2017; Gill, et al., 2017; Smith, 
et al., 2015; Huey & Witmer, 2016; Vidino & Hughes, 2015; Ducol, et al., 2016; Reynolds, 
2016; Conseil du statut de la femme & Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to 
Violence, 2016). What appears to be a uniting factor among such studies is that the significant 
influence takes place offline. However, data on ISIS supporters’ intentions, motives, and 
behavior throughout their radicalization trajectories remain scarce, even for those in the legal 
system. 
To that end, findings of 11 studies that were carried out in an empirically robust 
manner were recorded to visualize them in terms of networks and demonstrate their 
connectivity. The analysis was carried out using NodeXL (Smith, et al., 2010). The 11 
studies’ observations and findings, not data, were recorded into NodeXL. The software 
accepts entries in terms of edges. Each edge constitutes 2 nodes (Vertex or node 1 and 2). For 
instance, members of a newly formed offline cluster (e.g., a group of likeminded friends, 
relatives, and/or acquaintances who are supportive of ISIS) were found to consume online 
jihadist propaganda (e.g., Vidino & Hughes, 2015). In NodeXL, the aforementioned findings 
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were recorded through 2 nodes: Cluster Formation (Vertex 1 or node 1) and Jihadi 
Propaganda (Vertex 2 or node 2). All nodes were registered manually to NodeXL. In total, 
321 edges (2 connected nodes) were recorded based on the findings and observations of the 
11 included studies. It is noteworthy, that due to the use of similar/identical cases and/or 
arriving to similar findings the initial number of edges was more than 700. After removing 
identical edges only 321 edges remained.     
Given the nature of the phenomenon, the resulting network was expected to show a 
level of complexity, making its reading and inspection challenging. Accordingly, grouping 
clusters on the basis of organic and emerging connections is believed to remediate the 
aforementioned issue, should it emerge (Smith, et al., 2010). To that effect, interactions and 
connectivity between themes and factors across the networks are thought to allow developing 
scenarios around mobilization trajectories, where such a transformation takes place. 
Extrapolating on the discussed scenarios and based on the conceptual map of the literature, 
this effort endeavors to infer a model that outlines possible dynamics between emerging 
groups and networks. That said, it is noteworthy that the inferred model is expected to be 
associated with a number of caveats. This paper is limited by the scope of the included 
studies. The 11 studies’ focus is overwhelmingly narrowed to the online milieu, specifically 
social media. Disparities and caveats in the resulting networks are outlined in detail in the 
study’s discussion. 
 
Radicalization 
 
Radicalization remains a contested term in academia (Schuurman & Taylor, 2018; 
Meleagrou-Hitchens & Kaderbhai, 2017; Kundnani, 2012; Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2012; 
Neumann, 2003). The studies satisfying the inclusion criteria offered varying 
exemplifications. A number of endeavors opted to clarify the term using the definition of U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (Smith, et al., 2015; Ghajar-Khosravi, Kwantes, 
Derbentseva, & Huey, 2016). In that sense, radicalization is a process of forming a belief 
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system that indicates a willingness to facilitate, support, or use violent actions as a mean to 
bring about societal change (Chertoff, 2007). 
Furthermore, giving the varying objectives of the included research, defining 
radicalization or engaging in the debate on the concept was not always on the agenda (Berger 
& Morgan, 2015; Alexander, 2016; Hughes & Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2017; Gill, et al., 2017; 
Berger, 2016). Notwithstanding that in a number of cases the decision to refrain was justified, 
for others defining radicalization and engaging in the debate was rather necessary and yet the 
authors ignored the importance of providing a working definition (Ghajar-Khosravi, Kwantes, 
Derbentseva, & Huey, 2016; Saif, Fernandez, Rowe, & Alani, 2016; Awan, 2017; Ferrara, 
2017). That said, two studies provided their own working definitions to allow for their 
research questions to be addressed (Rowe & Saif, 2016; Huey & Witmer, 2016). For instance, 
Huey and Witmer (2016) posited that radicalization refers to the engagement in criminal 
behavior on behalf of ISIS or migrating to join the group. As such, it is safely argued that the 
term is equated with violent extremism. Additionally, Rowe and Saif (2016) opted to define 
radicalization signals, that is to say, sharing and using pro-ISIS language.  
To that end, there seems to be some level of agreement that adheres to the complexity 
and varying dynamics of radicalization, albeit, the reviewed studies adopted that view either 
explicitly (Vidino & Hughes, 2015) or implicitly (Reynolds, 2016; Ducol, Bouchard, Davies, 
Ouellet, & Neudecker, 2016; Conseil du statut de la femme & Centre for the Prevention of 
Radicalization Leading to Violence, 2016). While narrowed to actors who engaged with, 
supported, or facilitated ISIS in some capacity, studies ascribing to this perspective did not 
posit that violent extremism is a definite outcome of radicalization.  
Moreover, empirical research on individuals in the legal system, for attempting to or 
traveling to ISIS-held territories, providing material support, or intending to or plotting 
domestic terrorist attacks, demonstrate diverse profiles, ‘triggering’ factors, and mobilization 
trajectories (Smith, et al., 2015; Vidino & Hughes, 2015; Reynolds, 2016; Huey & Witmer, 
2016; Ducol, Bouchard, Davies, Ouellet, & Neudecker, 2016). Building on the included 
studies, it is argued that given the differences and highly diverse profiles of those involved 
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with ISIS, they are likely to differ in terms of motivational, attitudinal, and behavioral factors 
eliciting and facilitating such involvement. As such, radicalization remains highly 
individualized and complex process (Dechesne & Meines, 2012; Heydemann, 2014; Rahimi 
& Graumans, 2015; Pressman, 2016) and is often the manifestation of poorly known 
structural and personal variables (Vidino, 2010). To that effect, Radicalization Leading to 
Violence (RLV) was explored by Conseil du statut de la femme and Centre for the Prevention 
of Radicalization Leading to Violence (2016) to provide a more nuanced perspective on the 
phenomenon. 
RLV is understood as the amalgamation of radicalized ideological commitment and 
the conviction that violence is a legitimate moral practice in defending that ideology (Conseil 
du statut de la femme & Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, 
2016). In this sense, RLV is not equated with violent extremism. This distinction is helpful in 
outlining the complex (Campana & Lapointe, 2012; Amghar, Boubekeur, & Emerson, 2007; 
Bjørgo, 2004; Klausen, 2015), emergent (Bouhana & Wikstrom, 2011), and nonlinear and 
dynamic (Davis & Cragin, 2009; Horgan, 2008; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Khalil, 2014) nature 
of RLV. In other words, the mobilization of individuals down the paths of RLV is not reduced 
or explained based on single-factor or deterministic causes; is inclusive of person, context, 
and their intersectionality; and is expected to differ in terms of the elements facilitating such a 
transition, their impacts, and the mechanism through which they operate. As such, violent 
extremism is viewed as a possible outcome of radicalized ideological commitment, 
particularly when that commitment manifests in an ascribed legitimacy to promoting, 
supporting, and using violence in defense of one’s ideology against perceived environmental 
threats and/or in trying to cause a dramatic change to existing social and political systems. To 
that end, it is argued that RLV is a more inclusive and nuanced conceptualization that allows 
for a better understanding of violent extremism, discerning milieus (i.e. online and offline) 
and the dynamics operating within them, and ultimately in tailoring initiatives to counter 
violent extremism (i.e. intelligence, hard [e.g., suspension, removing, and filtering material], 
and soft [e.g., educational and psychological interventions, and counter messaging]). 
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The Milieus 
 
Among the included studies, there is a fair level of consensus that the complex, emergent, and 
dynamic and non-linear nature of the phenomenon extends to the milieus wherein the 
mobilization takes place. Cases within the included studies, with the exception of the ones 
utilizing computational science solely, indicate interactions between the two milieus (offline 
and online) rather than exclusively online RLV dynamics.  
 
Online 
Excluded Studies 
As mentioned earlier, a number of the reviewed and assessed studies resorted to 
computational science, solely, to detect RLV-associated factors. Generally, this category of 
research suffers major theoretical and empirical challenges hindering its contribution to the 
fields of violent extremism or counter-terrorism. For instance, Chatfield, et al.’s (2015) paper 
aim is to examine “How do IS members/supporters use Twitter for terrorism communication: 
propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment?” (p. 239). To address the aforementioned 
qualitative question, the authors devised a descriptive quantitative method. The paper makes 
the claim that it carried out a systematic review of 56 articles. The number of the citation 
when unrelated articles and Australian press material were omitted came very short of the 56 
studies. How their framework came to being is unclear. Their analyses are arguably 
problematic and misleading. For instance, they listed the following tweets as ones used by 
ISIS propaganda disseminator to recruit online: “This is the time for Muslim Kurds in Turkey 
to show whether they can ever counter PKK”; and “@Himalaya888 you do realize IS wants to 
destroy every single nation-state, Arab or Kurd or communist doesnt matter, that they come 
across?” (P. 247, Table 1). Moreover, the authors did not provide reliable contents, much less 
evidence, to support their claims. 
  
 
 
 
 
Asaad Almohammad: From Total Islam to the Islamic State 
 
 
 
 
10 
Summer 2018 
Nr. 15 
ISSN: 2363-9849          
In another attempt, Ghajar-Khosravi, et al., (2016) explored strategies and techniques 
that allow the analysis of the contents of ISIS fangirls’ twitter feeds and used that technique to 
differentiate the feeds from two control groups, namely, a randomly selected group of age-
matched girls and a group that posts ISIS-related content. The authors picked certain items to 
contrast differences between the groups in terms of sentiment towards concepts. Four 
concepts were selected to contrast the differences between the groups. These items are: Jihad, 
Unbeliever, Sport, and West. However, their hypothesis was not supported. In discussing their 
results, the authors continued picking the three items (jihad, sport, and unbeliever) for the 
groups even after uncovering that there was no significant difference. In addition, the 
researchers ignored that their supposed ISIS fangirls presented the most negative sentiments 
toward ISIS, Islam and punishment, compared to the other groups. 
Furthermore, Canbegi (2016) endeavored to demonstrate the risks of radicalization by 
measuring the relationship between online social interactions and ISIS attacks. Rather than 
highlighting the risks of radicalization by measuring the nexus between ISIS attacks and 
online social interactions, the paper just provided graphical figures highlighting the public 
interest in such traumatic events. No support for the aforementioned claims was provided. The 
study also suffered from major inconsistencies regarding its aim and method. Under a similar 
veil, Rowe and Saif (2016) used data mining to determine pro-ISIS key terms. The authors 
equated the use of pro-ISIS terms with activation of radicalized behavior. There were not 
many differences between pro-ISIS and anti-ISIS accounts in terms of the use of unique 
terms, retweets and mentions. However, it was suggested that the frequencies were indicative 
of exhibiting pro-ISIS language. The previous argument poses a number of concerns and may 
raise false positives. Throughout the paper both ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ ISIS accounts were found to 
use similar terms. For instance, it is observed that the terms labelled by the authors as pro-
ISIS language are also used by experts, online counter narrative disseminators, and 
governmental accounts (e.g., Official twitter account of the International Coalition for 
Operation Inherent Resolve [@CJTFOIR]). 
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Moreover, Saif, et al., (2016) argued that by extracting entities (e.g., ISIS, United 
Nations, and Syria) from users’ timelines and classifying them based on their semantic 
concepts (e.g., Jihadist group, Company, and Country), such terms would allow the automatic 
detection of radicalized stances. Besides being simplistic, their study raises other concerns 
regarding the utilized data and results. Notably, Badawy and Ferrara (2017) aimed to 
determine the nature of topics that ISIS focuses on and to examine how real events influence 
ISIS rhetoric online. Their analyses showed some form of correlation between tweets and 
‘real life’ events. This aspect might warrant research if twitter users and ISIS existed in two 
different universes, but if, as claimed by the researchers, the analyzed accounts belonged to 
those affiliated with or supportive of ISIS such findings are expected. Though, it should be 
noted that based on their findings, many of those supposed ISIS members and supporters were 
unaware of events propagated by ISIS even after they long unfolded. 
Ferrara (2017) endeavored to define a methodological online radicalization framework 
for collecting, validating, and analyzing data. Apart from providing some visual 
representation of the activities of suspended accounts, the study deviated significantly from its 
stated objectives. Additionally, Awan (2017) examined 2,050 results from 50 twitter accounts 
and the comments and posts of 100 Facebook accounts to determine and contextualize the 
impact that ISIS exerted on these social media platforms. It is unclear how the search of 
generic key words like country names (Iraq and Syria) or the use of the acronyms (ISIS and 
ISIL), which the terrorist group itself despises and punishes people who use, led the author to 
make across the board generalization and define classes of ISIS’ supporters.   
To that effect, it is safely argued that most included studies from the field of 
computational science either intentionally or unintentional ignored existing research on 
radicalization, countering terrorism, or violent extremism. This often then leads to unhealthy 
exaggeration of the role of social media and might further lead to proposing counter measures 
that would hinder those leading the fight against ISIS more than ISIS members and 
sympathizers online (for the financial and manpower burden such studies poses on security 
services see, Munk, 2017). More fundamentally, it is important for researchers using 
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computational science to recognize that answers to questions of RLV, violent extremism, 
and/or terrorism are not confined within a sole discipline. Rather than appropriating terms and 
concepts from the literature on violent extremism or terrorism, researchers should consider the 
contextual and theoretical differences between these areas before treating the fields as 
recipients and donors. 
 
Included Studies  
Among the studies using computational science and satisfying the inclusion criteria, 
two reports emerged as the most methodologically rigorous endeavors in that category 
(Berger & Morgan, 2015; Berger, 2016). Both studies disclosed and detailed the methods and 
associated caveats. Furthermore, Berger and Morgan’s report (2015) provided a snapshot of 
demographic information on ISIS supporters on twitter. The purpose behind their research 
was to provide preliminary data to allow future researchers to compare the ramification of 
accounts’ suspension. Based on their observation, the authors suggested that the suspension 
reduced ISIS supporters’ online operations (e.g., broadcasting its propaganda outside its core 
audience) and limited ISIS’ network from growing and expanding. The report argued that 
suspensions also resulted in more inward online interactions between ISIS twitter supporters.  
In a more recent study, Berger (2016) endeavored to provide a preliminary comparison 
between white nationalists, Nazi sympathizers and ISIS in terms of their use of twitter. The 
report noted the lower level of online cohesiveness of white nationalists and their smaller 
twitter concentration as compared to ISIS. ISIS was argued to have centralized social media 
strategies that provide users with guidelines for when they decide to meaningfully follow 
them. In terms of recruitment, ISIS appeared to use a systematic approach. Its supporters, 
including members of the organization, spread information that raised awareness about the 
group. ISIS recruiters seem to spot and observe potential recruits, providing them with a sense 
of belonging to the community before isolating them from pre-existing networks and 
communities. ISIS online recruitment activities were reported to aim to motivate targeted 
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potential recruits to join the group (becoming a fighter), carry out domestic attacks, and/or 
provide material support to the jihadi cause. 
 
Hybrid Approach: Online and Offline  
Included Studies  
The RLV dynamics were not always investigated by focusing only on social media or 
the online milieu. For instance, based on 63 cases, Smith, et al., (2015) argued that almost 
always the mobilization of foreign fighters involved face to face interactions, either in person 
or virtually. Moreover, Vidino and Hughes (2015) presented two cases where social media 
seemed to play a significant role in the mobilization of those individuals down the paths of 
RLV. That said, in most cases the role of social media was complemented by offline 
interactions. In cases when social media played a complementary role, individuals did not 
embark on their RLV trajectories in front of their computers but rather through offline 
interactions with social contacts that had ties to the jihadi scene. In another study, Reynolds’ 
(2016) analyses of 99 cases of German foreign fighters suggest that exclusive internet 
influence on RLV dynamics remains rare. Moreover, the mobilization of foreign fighters was 
not sufficiently predicted by their poor integration into German communities.  
Furthermore, the investigation of RLV trajectories was argued to encompass pre-
exposure stage (Push and Pull factors), stage of initial exposure (Offline and Online), and 
stage of engagement (Ducol, Bouchard, Davies, Ouellet, & Neudecker, 2016). The analyses 
suggested that two of the three ISIS-related cases maintained some level of autonomous 
internet exposure to look for and find answers. The findings also showed the internet was not 
the avenue through which individuals on RLV trajectories looked for co-conspirators. In some 
cases, the internet was found to be used to gain operational knowledge and build connections 
to plot attacks.  
Moreover, Huey and Witmer (2016) endeavored to identify the characteristic and roles 
of ISIS’ fangirls and their RLV dynamics. Of the 20 fangirls in their sample, 2 displayed 
indisputable signs of RLV. In both cases, the authorities were alerted by school officials about 
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the fangirls. The authors made a mention of extensive offline connection to ISIS recruiters 
and involvement in romantic relationships with ISIS members in the cases of the two arrested 
girls.  
In an effort to explore the radicalization trajectories of women who traveled or desired 
to go to jihadi-held territories in Syria, Conseil du statut de la femme and Centre for the 
Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (2016) employed data from a dozen of 
semi-directed interviews. ISIS propaganda was not presented as the sole influential factor on 
the RLV trajectories of the interviewed sample. The young interviewees reported that their 
interest in immigrating to ISIS-held territory was also associated with implicit messages from 
a charismatic figure at a local community center. Similar peers also maintained an influence 
over each other. To that effect, it is noteworthy that it was only when the interviewees were 
faced with doubts and when they were seeking answers regarding the conditions of life in 
Syria that they started to look online for answers. Some of the interviewees started discussions 
with women affiliated with ISIS and in Syria when they could not find answers. The realistic 
disclosure that was provided by recruiters seemed to motivate the interviewees and convince 
them of the importance of immigrating to Syria. ISIS’ female recruiters helped the 
interviewees to plan their escape. There was no evidence of encouragement or assistance in 
plotting attacks domestically. 
Alexander’s report (2016) is another gender-differentiated effort. Her study aimed to 
examine the roles of 25 cases of American females in the legal system for various jihadi-
related charges. The study showed a diverse demographic makeup of that group, suggesting 
an indiscernible overarching profile of female jihadists in America. Based on the review of 
available material, the report classified the cases into: Plotters, Supporters, and Travelers. The 
study argued that online and offline dynamics complement one another. The cases presented 
in the three categories indicate a complementary role of the internet in the mobilization of 
female jihadi Americans. 
Hughes and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2017) investigated the role of ISIS’ virtual 
entrepreneurs in plotting and providing encouragement and facilitation to ISIS supporters in 
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the United States. The term virtual entrepreneur was used to encapsulate the varying roles 
played by such operatives. Their roles spanned across a number of functions including, but 
not limited to: assisting sympathizers to travel to ISIS held territories, carrying out attacks, 
connecting plotters, and encouraging cooperation and domestic attacks. Though, such roles 
and influences came in later in the RLV dynamics. The use of social media and encrypted 
messaging application was highlighted and present in the analyses. 
Extrapolating on the notion that terrorists vary in terms of their capabilities, criminal 
sophistication, needs, and preferences, the affordance opportunities that extremists seek in the 
cyber-space was expected to differ (Gill, et al., 2017). That study updated an existing list of 
convicted/killed terrorist who planned or carried out attacks in the United Kingdom. Their 
sample included right-wing extremists and jihadi extremists (al-Qaeda and ISIS inspired). The 
study cautioned about drawing a dichotomy of offline versus online RLV. Furthermore, the 
authors acknowledged that online and offline interactions go hand in hand in RLV dynamics 
and planning attacks. From that perspective, RLV is cyber-enabled rather than cyber-
dependent. In other words, individuals would use the internet to reinforce their beliefs rather 
than challenge them.   
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Findings and documented observations of 11 studies (Berger & Morgan, 2015; Alexander, 
2016; Hughes & Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2017; Gill, et al., 2017; Berger, 2016; Smith, et al., 
2015; Huey & Witmer, 2016; Vidino & Hughes, 2015; Ducol, et al., 2016; Reynolds, 2016; 
Conseil du statut de la femme & Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to 
Violence, 2016), not their data, were registered (for more see the method’s section). 
Subsequently, these findings and observations were visualized to capture the connection 
between factors related to ISIS, the online and offline milieus, and RLV mobilization (see 
Figure 1). The 11 studies were discussed in earlier sections. The selection was not done 
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haphazardly but rather on the bases of the methodological rigor (for more see the previous 
sections). The analysis was carried out using NodeXL (Smith, et al., 2010).         
Figure 1 shows dense and complex networks of connections between ISIS, the two 
milieus (online and offline), mobilization, and factors associated directly and indirectly with 
the four major groups. The illustration depicts, to some level, the complex, emergent, and 
nonlinear and dynamic nature of the RLV phenomenon. To that effect, the links between the 
online milieu, particularly social media, with mobilization, and other groups and elements are 
the densest and most complex. 
Several factors are believed to result in disparities in the density and complexity of 
connectivity. First, the scope of the selected studies is overwhelmingly and disproportionately 
narrowed to the online milieu and its associated influence on the mobilizations of individuals 
across their RLV trajectories. Second, the roles and functions of social media received the 
most significant scrutiny. This is hardly surprising given the role of social media in 
disseminating ISIS’ message and the reinforcement of its brand. Vox-Pol’s focus on violent 
online political extremism undoubtedly crystalized in such disparities.  
Third, data on events and interactions in the offline milieu remain scarce. Faced with 
this gap, previous researcher resorted to governmental documentations, court documents, 
interviews with individuals familiar with the perpetrators, and media releases. Such efforts 
helped, to a certain level, in outlining the influence of offline forces, in drawing connection 
between the two milieus, and in identifying mobilization dynamics and the different roles 
ISIS plays in facilitating RLV mobilization. However, a clearer understanding of attitudinal, 
motivational, and behavioral elicitors of different RLV dynamics remains challenging, giving 
the dearth of access and availability of such data (For more see the review above). 
Fourth, extrapolating on Gill, et al.’s (2017) assessment, the internet provides 
affordance opportunities wherein safer interactions take place between sympathizers, 
supporters, propagandists, and recruiters. For instance, an online affordance opportunity could 
be related to the sophistication of methods that an individual far down in the RLV trajectory 
aspires to use. Given ISIS’, and other terrorist organizations’, devotion to providing 
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instructional materials for wannabe domestic terrorists, such an individual might seek guides 
online. Such guides are an instance of online affordance opportunities. Though, it should be 
noted that ISIS is pushing for less sophisticated methods to minimize the potential of plots 
getting thwarted by security services. To that end, it is important to acknowledge that RLV is 
cyber-enabled rather than cyber-dependent. Moreover, as shown in the following figure, 
online and offline affordance opportunities often complement each other in RLV dynamics. 
Fifth, it should be noted that a caveat is thought to result from the reading of the 
results using this technique. In other words, the inserted data and its reading are highly 
subjective and may vary if the analysis is carried out by different authors. Efforts to minimize 
the ramifications of the subjectivity of the utilized findings and their interpretation were 
made. 
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Figure 1: Findings 
and Documented 
Observations of 
Connectivity 
between ISIS, 
Mobilization, and 
Offline and Online 
Affordance 
Opportunities. 
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That said, the readability of networks depicted in figure 1 is challenging given its density and 
complexity. For that reason, the network was further grouped to detect interactions that take 
place across the groups and between different elements of RLV trajectories (see figure 2). 
This technique allows clustering connections that are evolving or emerging organically as 
opposed to connections imposed on the networks (Smith, et al., 2010). To that effect, 
elements of the network that are weakly connected would appear in their own separate groups 
based on their defined influences and roles. 
As displayed in figure 2, there are a number of cross-group interactions. Line 
thickness indicates the strength of the connection and the individual lines suggest interactions 
(Smith, et al., 2010). The single group with the strongest interactions with other groups is 
mobilization. That box, on the left side of the figure, also shows the densest in-group 
connections. It presents the different ends of mobilization categories, namely: foreign fighters, 
supporters, attackers, travelers, recruiters, virtual entrepreneurs, plotters, returnees, and 
sympathizers. Some of these categories can be collapsed into others. For example, while the 
distinction between travelers and foreign fighters is useful, the studies defined a foreign 
fighter as an individual who traveled or intended to travel to ISIS-held territories in support of 
the group (e.g., Smith, et al., 2015). Plotters and attackers were also defined similarly. To that 
end, attackers/plotters mobilization is thought to be associated with existing networks in real 
life and connection to an ISIS recruiter or virtual entrepreneur (e.g., Hughes & Meleagrou-
Hitchens, 2017; Vidino & Hughes, 2015; Smith, et al., 2015). Virtual entrepreneurs are 
operatives whose roles spanned across a number of functions including, but not limited to: 
assisting sympathizers to travel to ISIS held territories, carrying out attacks, connecting 
plotters, and encouraging cooperation and domestic attacks (for review see, Hughes & 
Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2017). As shown in the network, plotters are also instrumental in 
creating propaganda material outside ISIS strongholds. The box also outlined the diverse 
demographic makeup of mobilized individuals (e.g., Alexander, 2016; Smith, et al., 2015). 
However, it should be stressed that the connectivity and influence extend beyond the assigned 
boxes of networks. 
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As shown in figure 2, the online milieu is divided into three groups. The division, 
which appears in the boxes in the top center and right and the bottom right side of the figure, 
is arguably assigned on the basis of the affordance opportunities. The box centered on the 
online group suggests that online affordance opportunities allow mobilized potential plotters 
to obtain operational knowledge regarding targeting and instructional material of 
sophisticated attack methods (e.g., Improvised Explosive Devices [IEDs]) and to connect with 
co-conspirators (e.g., Gill, et al., 2017). It also connects them to pro-ISIS clerics, allows them 
to build connections, surveil targets, reinforces their hostilities towards out-groups, 
encourages them, and allows them to prepare for their attacks (e.g., Hughes & Meleagrou-
Hitchens, 2017). The box that revolves around the affordance opportunities provided by social 
media shows denser in-group connections compared to the former. That is possibly due to the 
interactive nature of social media and the overwhelming focus on the subject by the selected 
studies. Three functions of ISIS’ strategic use of social media can be seen in the box. These 
are namely: nodes, shout-outs, and amplifiers (Vidino & Hughes, 2015). Another ISIS 
mobilization role that is connected through its echo chambers is also present; social media 
operatives who spot potential recruits are showed and believed to be instrumental (Berger & 
Morgan, 2015; Berger, 2016). The last box on the bottom right of the figure is reflective of 
ISIS centralized social media strategies. As the box shows, that factor allows ISIS to 
strengthen awareness regarding the group and isolate potential recruits by nurturing their 
sense of belonging and answering their inquiries (Vidino & Hughes, 2015; Berger & Morgan, 
2015; Berger, 2016). 
Above that box (on the bottom right side of the figure) outlining the connectivity of 
ISIS centralized social media strategies, the figure presents a box designated to ISIS as a 
group. Elements of ISIS’ brand (cool, adventurous, and romantic), among other factors, which 
facilitate the mobilization of ISIS fangirls are demonstrated (e.g., Huey & Witmer, 2016).  In 
the bottom center, the figure shows two boxes; one demonstrates the offline milieu and the 
other presents Total Islam. 
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The box designated to the affordance provided offline demonstrates the roles of peers 
and family members in forming clusters and thereby, offline echo chambers (e.g., Vidino & 
Hughes, 2015; Conseil du statut de la femme & Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization 
Leading to Violence, 2016). That box also suggests the influence of connections (Salafists, 
mosques, community centers, ISIS members) in mobilizations across RLV trajectories (e.g., 
Reynolds, 2016). Compared to the online milieu, networks and connection in the offline 
milieu are tied to multi-actor attacks rather that lone actors (e.g., Gill, et al., 2017).  
As for Total Islam, the box shows that the concept is the center of its in-group 
connectivity. Total Islam is a phenomenon in which an individual embraces a rigid Islamist 
socio-political view that becomes the exclusive source of ones’ identity and relationships that 
impels the rejection of all that deviates from that supposed pure interpretation of Islam (for 
review see, Conseil du statut de la femme & Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization 
Leading to Violence, 2016). The concept is extrapolated on religiosity of rupture and 
reflective of identity rather than spirituality (Kepel, 2000). It is best viewed as a spectrum 
wherein it ranges in strength. On one end of that spectrum, Total Islam becomes the sole 
identity marker of those embracing it, giving its totalizing nature over one’s beliefs, behavior, 
and relationships with the social and political worlds. In this sense, Total Islam is a 
manifestation of identity shell. That is to say, a type of identity that provides individuals with 
purpose and protection from identity anxieties and uncertainties generated from social and 
political environments (Conseil du statut de la femme & Centre for the Prevention of 
Radicalization Leading to Violence, 2016). 
The box outlining Total Islam connectivity and its group indicates that traumatic 
events and hardship, identity dilemmas, questions of identity, and the search for meaning 
facilitate the embrace of this identity marker (Conseil du statut de la femme & Centre for the 
Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, 2016). Moreover, embracing that form of 
identity shell is associated with increased conflicts with family members, perceived purity, 
social alienation, and stigmatization, rejection of others, and the formation of or joining a 
cluster as a support system. To that end, the clarification of the aforementioned instances of 
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in-groups’ connectivity is thought to be an appropriate point of departure to reading and 
interpreting outgroups interactions, and thereby inferring and discussing a model of RLV 
dynamics based on the conceptual maps of the literature. 
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Figure 1: 
In-group 
and 
Outgroups 
Interactions. 
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Extrapolating on the perspectives of 11 studies from which this analysis drew its data, in 
reconciliation with the visualization of group clusters, the concept Total Islam is employed in 
inferring a number of scenarios, and ultimately, in developing a model of RLV dynamics. 
Figure 2 shows sparse and thick lines that indicate direct connectivity between the RLV 
mobilization trajectories and affordances provided through the online and offline milieus. 
Total Islam direct connections are present in the seven boxes in the figure, including social 
media and ISIS-centralized strategies to manage such platforms. It is believed that while 
many of the connections are sparse, exploring Total Islam connectivity is appropriate and a 
useful step.  
Documented observations and findings of the 11 utilized studies indicate support for 
the aforementioned argument. Elements outside the box that outlines Total Islam in-group 
connections are associated with factors of varying intensity within and outside their groups. In 
other words, Total Islam is thought to have wider connections to elements beyond the ones 
that appear in figure 2. The direct and indirect connectivity to elements across groups are 
assessed and visualized in a number of figures. 
To that end, Total Islam’s direct and indirect connectivity with elements across all 
groups was inspected and visualized (see figures 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7). As mentioned earlier, Total 
Islam is best understood as a spectrum; at its extreme it becomes the identity marker that 
defines individuals ascribing to this form of identity. Evidence from the selected studies 
suggests Total Islam associations with endured hardships and trauma, questions of identity, 
identity dilemma, and search for meaning, and ultimately identity shell. That identity marker 
has a number of manifestations, namely: perceived societal alienation and stigmatization, 
purity, rejection of others who do not ascribe to such an identity, and identification with a 
persecuted community that is thought to be targeted for their embrace of the same identity. 
When it becomes the total foundation of relationships with the social world, it is believed to 
cause fracturing with family members and friends if such individuals do not ascribe to the 
same totalizing identity. Those who cannot coerce and/or persuade their family members into 
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accepting or embracing Total Islam are thought to gravitate to clusters of like-mindedness that 
operate as an identity-based support system. 
Figure 3 depicts the interactions between the groups that emerged after accounting for 
clustering in terms of connectivity. Particularly, the figure demonstrates affordance 
opportunities provided in the online milieu and interactions with Total Islam. For instance, the 
online milieu may provide those ascribing to that identity marker with theological and 
persuasive justification that strengthens their hostility and legitimizes violence towards those 
deemed ‘impure.’ Furthermore, figure 4 indicates the use of social media by those on the 
Total Islam identity spectrum. Being part of ISIS echo chamber is thought to allow ISIS 
recruiters to spot them. Spotting potential recruits on ISIS social media accounts is part of 
ISIS’ centralized social media strategies. Spotted targets are isolated further from connections 
that do not ascribe to Total Islam as the totalizing marker of identity. ISIS endeavors to make 
those on that identity marker’s trajectories aware of the group’s dogma and life in the ‘pure’ 
caliphate to advance their isolated and potential recruits’ sense of belonging to the group.  
Figure 5 details offline affordance opportunities and their connectivity to those on Total Islam 
spectrum. Such affordance opportunities encompass factors including, but not limited to: 
connection to Salafist networks, foreign fighters, cluster formation, and offline echo 
chambers. In the offline milieu, individuals ascribing to this identity marker may form or join 
clusters which may strengthen their identity shells, making Total Islam their sole driver in the 
social world.  
Moreover, figure 6 indicates that such individuals may endeavor to get involved in 
financial schemes to support ISIS. As demonstrated in figure 7, the mobilization of those 
ascribing to Total Islam as their sole identity marker present a variety of RLV trajectories. 
The figure categorizes them into: plotters/attackers, returnees, foreign fighters, supporters, 
and sympathizers. 
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Figure 2: Total 
Islam and Online 
Affordance 
Opportunities. 
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Figure 3: Total 
Islam, Social Media, 
and ISIS Centralized 
Social Media 
Strategies. 
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Figure 4: Total 
Islam and Offline 
Affordance 
Opportunities. 
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Figure 5: Total 
Islam and ISIS. 
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Figure 6: Total 
Islam and 
Mobilization. 
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To that end, it is noteworthy that the previous figures show a wealth of connections 
that could be read and interpreted differently. Total Islam, as a marker reflecting a spectrum 
of totalizing identity, was used to describe its presence, antecedents (crises), and 
consequences (grievances) along with a number of RLV dynamics. The outlined trajectories 
are subjective scenarios and should be investigated further. Based on the previous conceptual 
maps of the literature, the following figure presents the inferred model which summarizes the 
role of Total Islam in RLV dynamics. 
  
 
Figure 8: Total Islam:  RLV Dynamics as a Subject of Reciprocal Affordance Opportunities  
 
In line with the linkage-based approach (Ingram, 2016; 2017), the model is inclusive 
of identity-based crisis. Extrapolating on that view and the previous discussion, this form of 
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crisis is believed to strengthen the embrace of Total Islam totalizing identity as a solution. The 
increased dominance of this identity marker manifests in grievances given its zero-sum nature 
and exclusiveness in governing one’s relationship with the social world. Jihadi-based terrorist 
organizations, ISIS in the case of this study, capitalize on affordance opportunities provided 
in the offline milieu (e.g., existing clusters, charismatic preachers, recruiters, supporters, etc.) 
and over the internet (e.g., propaganda videos, social media, online-disseminated literature, 
supporters, etc.) to amplify both the crises and grievances while propagating the righteousness 
associated with embracing and nurturing that identity marker.  
Individuals ascribing to the identity advocate it (e.g., to peers, to family members, etc.) 
and seek likeminded others (e.g., join existing clusters and form a new cluster) using 
affordance opportunities provided in both milieus. Collectively or individually, the driving 
crises and manifested grievances may result in uncertainties as to a course of action to deal 
with the social world. Increased anxieties associated with such vagueness could lead those 
individuals to pursue answers from networks offline and over social media. Giving their 
conspicuous presence (e.g., questions in a community center or over social media, posts, 
comments, etc.), supporters/sympathizers/members of the terrorist organization using such 
affordances become more aware of such individuals and study their questions (e.g., Berger & 
Morgan, 2015; Berger, 2016; Vidino & Hughes, 2015; Conseil du statut de la femme & 
Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, 2016).  
As mentioned earlier, Jihadi-based terrorist organizations amplify the crises and 
acknowledge grievances. In doing so, Total Islam-associated anxieties may further increase. 
Online and offline affordance opportunities allow Jihadi-based terrorist organizations to 
isolate those experiencing such identity anxieties, disambiguating vagueness and providing 
them with a sense of belonging.  
As Total Islam becomes more defining of one’s identity, it is believed to increase 
perceived stigmatization and alienation beyond the offline and online Jihadi-based support 
system (e.g., peers, clusters, echo chambers) (e.g., Conseil du statut de la femme & Centre for 
the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, 2016). That support system may 
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crystalize in a stronger identity shell and enhance one’s sense of purity and legitimacy. The 
unsatisfied need for legitimacy in the social world could exacerbate that identity-based crisis 
and adds more grievances (e.g., Ingram, 2016; Ingram, 2017). The affordance opportunities 
available for those defined by such an identity marker and jihadi-based terrorist organizations 
nurture rejection of others and promote hostility as a justified course of actions to gain such 
legitimacy. 
To that effect, when violent acts of jihadi-based terrorist organizations become more 
tied to resolving Total Islam identity-based crises and to addressing its associated grievances, 
it may facilitate the mobilization down the paths of RLV. RLV mobilization takes many 
forms, including the creation and dissemination of propaganda material and mere acts of 
declaring allegiances to ISIS through social media or an encrypted application (e.g., Vidino & 
Hughes, 2015). More radical forms of such mobilization include: providing material support, 
immigration, and plotting. The mobilization trajectories could be inspired or directed 
depending on the utilized affordance opportunities. For instance, earlier discussions suggest 
that individuals may use the internet or networks in the real world to gain operational 
knowledge. Moreover, studies on foreign fighters/travelers uncovered that while most were 
facilitated, both virtually and in the real world, some were not (e.g., Smith, et al., 2015). 
Jihadi-based terrorist organizations use online and offline affordance opportunities to inspire, 
motivate, facilitate, and direct the mobilization down the many RLV paths. As mentioned 
earlier, mobilized individuals use of the affordance opportunities varies. For instance, plotters 
intending to use IEDs or target governmental facilities are more likely to use the internet to 
gain knowledge required to carry out such attacks (e.g., Gill, et al., 2017). Moreover, multi-
actor attacks are thought to be connected to offline networks and relationships. 
To that end, it is noteworthy that the inferred model is a subjective reading of the 
included studies and it is only a starting point. It is also believed to be limited to mobilization 
in the west rather than other parts of the world. The current model is not inclusive of various 
elements of the complex, emergent, and non-linear and dynamic of the RLV phenomenon. 
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Moreover, this is not a silver bullet model in that individuals would possibly disengage and 
prove resilient to mobilization efforts at different points of their trajectories. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The current study endeavored to explore the insight of research on radicalization and the role 
of the online milieu in the mobilization trajectories. To that effect, Vox-Pol’s library was 
selected to obtain studies on the phenomenon. Extrapolating on the thorough examination of 
the included studies, the selection of RLV was justified. Moreover, the understanding of the 
role of the offline milieu was deemed instrumental to clarifying ambiguities related to the 
impact of online activities. As such, the two milieus were clarified in terms of their associated 
affordance opportunities.  
On the bases of empirical rigor, observations and findings from 11 studies were 
recorded and examined. Beyond the virtual and physical avenues wherein different 
manifestations of RLV mobilization dynamics take place, the concept of Total Islam stood 
out. This form of identity marker was employed to interpret the resulting networks and 
connectivity between the recorded findings and observations. Scenarios around the Total 
Islam networks and their varying links and intensity were discussed. Taken altogether, a 
model of RLV dynamics in terms of their reciprocal interactions with affordance 
opportunities provided through both the online and offline milieus was inferred.  
Future research might examine and extend elements of this model using more 
libraries, research in different languages, and on various violent extremist groups. Also, 
research beyond western-based RLV is thought to expand the knowledge on the underpinning 
issue and allow for comparative analysis. By compiling more evidence and exploring 
connectivity, research may improve our understanding of other possible scenarios of RLV 
dynamics. That said, the current model is believed to allow inclusion of varying forms of 
countering violent extremism approaches and methods (e.g., intelligence, and hard and soft 
approaches) based on the affordance opportunities they provide to varying stakeholders (e.g., 
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security services, community-based initiatives, educational and psychological intervention 
programs, etc.). To that effect, in reconciliation with Gill, et al.’s (2017) assessment, an 
affordance-based countering violent extremism could be viewed as a crime prevention 
instrument, where different stakeholders (e.g., security services, communities, and schools) 
could use online and offline affordance opportunities to disrupt reciprocal interactions 
between those on RLV paths and violent extremist groups. 
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